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I.

INTRODUCTION

When analyzing the contentious jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights ("the Court" or "Inter-American Court"), it is
necessary to emphasize the fact that, during its first seventeen years of
work, the Court has ruled on the merits of nine cases presented for its
consideration.' In three cases, the demanded States have accepted the
claims formulated by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
("the Commission").' In another case, the Court admitted the

*

Secretary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

1.
Velsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988); Fair6n Garbi v. Honduras, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 6 (1989); Godfnez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20, 1989, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 6 (1989); Aloeboetoe et al.v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4,
1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 11 (1994); Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of
January 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 16 (1994); Neira Alegrfa v. Peri, Judgment
of January 19, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 20 (1995); Caballero Delgado v.
Colombia, Judgment of December 8, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 22 (1995); El
Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 19
(1995); Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.
26(1996).
2.
Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 11 (1994); El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
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discontinuance of the action presented by the Commission.' It should also
be pointed out that in one of the nine cases, the Court released the
demanded State from all responsibility. 4 In one case, the Court accepted
three of the preliminary exceptions interposed and in another, the Court

did not accept the interposed petition and remitted it to the Commission for
its consideration.6
When analyzing the aforementioned information, it is important to
note that in five cases in which the Court has entered judgment on the
merits and found a State responsible for violating the American Convention
on Human Rights ("the Convention"), 7 the processes have concluded in an
unusual manner. That is, as consequence of "[t]he situation or the
procedural act, either unilateral or bilateral, voluntary or mandatory, which
interrupts the normal development of the process. " ' To wit, the Cayara
Case9 concluded during the preliminary exceptions stage. Maqueda Case °
concluded because of the discontinuance presented by the Commission and
in the cases Aloeboetoe et al Case," El Amparo Case2 and Garrido and
Baigorria Case, 3 the States recognized their international responsibility for
the events that gave rise to the demand. In other words, there have been
five cases in which the process has not normally developed until its
completion.
(Ser. C) No. 19 (1995); Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 26 (1996).
3.
Maqueda v. Argentina, Judgment of January 17, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 18 (1995).
4.
Fair6n Garbi v. Honduras, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 6 (1989).
5.
Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 3, 1993, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No.14 (1994).
6.
Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. G 101/81
(1984).
7.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 ILM 673, OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1, (1970) [hereinafter The Convention].
8.
Luis Alvarez Julil et al., MANUAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL 299 (Editorial Astrea
1992).
9.
Cayara v. Perd, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 3, 1993, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 14 (1994).
10. Maqueda v. Argentina, Resolution of January 17, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 18 (1995).
11. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 11 (1994).
12. El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 19 (1995).
13. Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 26 (1996).
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There are four cases that are important to analyze because the process
has finished in an unusual manner because of the discontinuance in one
case and the acceptance of the claim in three other cases.. Consequently, it
is convenient to analyze the procedural forms of discontinuance and
acceptance of a claim. Subsequently, it is necessary to analyze their
regulation in the Rules of the Court and in the European Court of Human
Rights, the two regional international courts currently existing regarding
human rights, as well as in the Rules of the International Court of Justice.
Finally, it is important to analyze its application in the inter-American
system of protection of human rights by the Court in the four cases
previously mentioned.
Discontinuance14
The discontinuance is an unusual manner of completing the process,
by means of a procedural act of a dispositive nature, without entering a
judgment on the merits. To such end, one abdicates the right to act or the
right is waived in the course of the process, creating a form similar to that
of the renouncement, a means to extinguish obligations. That is to say, the
discontinuance can be of two classes: action and of right. In the first case,
the renouncement does not prevent the matter in question from being
outlined in a subsequent action. In the second case, giving up the right
upon which the action is founded terminates the proceedings. In any event,
the discontinuance is always a unilateral act on the part of the plaintiff.
A.

Acceptance of a Claim5
The procedural form of acceptance of a claim takes place when the
demanded party subjects itself to the substantial causes of action formulated
in the claim. Acceptance may be made at any time during the process, but
before a judgment on the merits is entered, since it implies the subjection
the petitioner's demands. It may be effective, if it is accompanied by the
fulfilling obligation. It may be expressed or implicit and may also be total
or partial, if it covers some or all of the petitioner's pretenses. In any
event, it implies the renouncement to the right to a defense.
B.

14.
Alvarez Julif et al., supra note 8, at 300-01; 2 MARIo ALBERTO FORNACIARI,
MoDOs ANORMALES DE TERMINACION DEL PROCESO 111 (Editorial DePalma 1988); Josh Ovalle
Favela, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 191 (Editorial Harla 1994); 2 JUAN MONTERO AROCA ET
AL., DERECHO JURIDICIONAL 349 (Editorial Josh Maria Bosch 1994); 2 Aldo Bacre, TEORIA
GENERAL DEL PROcESO 557 (Editorial Abeledo-Perrot 1991); 1 ENCICLOPEDIA JURfDICA BASICA

2438 (Editorial Civitas 1995) 2 NuEvAs ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA 282 (Editorial Seix, 1950).
15.
Alvarez Julii et al., supra note 8, at 300, 302; Alberto Fornaciari, supra note 14, at
112; OVALLE FAVELA, supra note 14, at 191; Montero Aroca et al, supra note 14, at 331; 1
Eduardo J. Couture, ESTUDIO DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 357 (Editorial DePalma 1979);

Bacre, supra note 14, at 406; ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA BASICA, supra note 14, at 434; NUEvAS
ENCICLOPEDIA JU RDICA, supra note 14, at 615.
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C. Rules of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights'6
Article 52.1 of the Rules of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights regulates the form of discontinuance. This article states as follows:
When the party that has brought the case notifies the Court of its
intention not to proceed with it, the Court shall, after hearing the
opinions of the other parties thereto and the representatives of the
the
victims or their next of kin, decide whether to discontinue
7
hearing and, consequently, to strike the case from its list.'
The Rules of the Inter-American Court are limited to regulating the
effects of the discontinuance, if such is applicable, previous consultation
with the petitioner's counsel, the presumed victim or relatives, if proper,
and consequently, whether it follows to supersede the case and file it.
However, even when a discontinuance is granted, article 54 of the Rules
provides that "the existence of the conditions indicated in the preceding
paragraphs notwithstanding, the Court may, bearing in mind its
responsibility to protect human rights, decide to continue the consideration
of a case."" One of these conditions is the discontinuance.
As for the procedural form of acceptance of the claim, the Rules of
the Inter-American Court do not contemplate it and article 31 of the Rules
regulates the application of article 63.1 of the Convention. That article
would also be applied in the event of an acceptance of a claim. This article
states:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that
the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom
that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the

consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the
breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party. 19

16.

THE INTER-AMERICAN

COURT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS: RULES OF PROCEDURE,

OEA/Ser. LIV/11.3. doc. 13, Corr.1 (1981), reprinedin 20 ILM 1289 (1980) [hereinafter The

Rules].
17.
18.

Id. art. 52.1.
Id.art. 54.

19.

The Convention, smpra note 7, art. 63.1.
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D.

Rules of the European Court of Human Rights'"
Article 48 of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights is
very similar to article 52.1 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
because the latter was taken from the former. Indeed, in Europe there is
also express regulation concerning the discontinuance, but these regulations
do not mention the acceptance of a claim. It is also stated that the
Chamber of the Court familiar with the case, considering its responsibilities
concerning the court in accordance with article 19 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 2 can order to continue the examination of a case in the presence
of a discontinuance. article 48, in its pertinent parts states the following:
When the party which has filed the case before the Court notifies
the Secretary of his intention not to proceed and the other parties
accept the discontinuance, the Chamber, after consulting with the
Commission and the applicant, will decide whether or not there is
place for the acceptance of the discontinuance and, consequently,
the closing of the case.22

The Chamber, according to the responsibilities that concern the Court
following to article 19 of the Convention, may order that the examination

of the case continue regardless of the discontinuance, friendly settlement,
transaction, etc.' Article 49 of the Rules of the European Court is also
similar to article 31 of the Rules of the Inter-American Court. It regulates
what is relevant to the application of article 50 of the European
Convention, which is applied in the case of a discontinuance. Article 50
states that:
If the decision of the Court declares that a resolution or a measure
ordered by a judicial authority or any other authority of a
contracting party is totally or partially against the obligations
20.

R. Eur. Ct. H.R. (repealed 1998).

Editor's note: The new European Court of Human Rights came into operation on November 1,
1998. However, Protocol No. 11 provides that the European Commission should continue until
October 31, 1999 to deal with cases which had been declared admissible before the date of entry
into force. With the establishment of the new court, the newly elected judges drafted new rules of
procedure for the European Court. See The New European Court of Human Rights, Historical
background,
organization
and
procedure
(visited
May
31,
1999)
< http://194.250.50.200/eng/PRESS/New%20Court/infodoc%20rvised%202.htmTransitional
period >.
21. Eur. Cony. H.R., art. 19. (September 1953) (visited May 31, 1999)
< http://www.coefr/eng/legaltxt/e-dh.htm#conv-dh >.
22. R. Eur. Ct. H.R., supra note 20, art. 48.

23.

Id.
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derived from the present Convention, and if the internal right of
this party only allows in an imperfect manner to repair the

consequences of this resolution or measure, the decision of the
Court will grant, if it proceeds, a just satisfaction to the injured

party.'
It is important to emphasize that article 48 regulates what is
established by article 37 of the European Convention that states in part as
follows:
The Commission may at any stage of the proceedings decide to

strike a petition of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to
the conclusion that:
The applicant does not intend to pursue his petition....
[H]owever, the Commission shall continue the examination of a
petition if respect for human rights as defined in this Convention
so requires. 23

E. Rules of the InternationalCourt of Justice26
The Rules of the International Court of Justice regulate matters related
to the discontinuance in a wide and detailed manner. Article 88 states that:
1.
If at any time before the final judgment on the merits has
been delivered the parties, either jointly or separately, notify the
Court in writing that they have agreed to discontinue the
proceedings, the Court shall make an order recording the
discontinuance and directing that the case be removed from the
list.
2. If the parties have agreed to discontinue the proceedings in
consequence of having reached a settlement of the dispute and if
they so desire, the Court may record this fact in the order for the
removal of the case from the list, or indicate in, or annex to, the
order, the terms of the settlement.
3. If the Court is not sitting, any order under this article may
be made by the President.
24.
25.

Id. art. 50.
Eur. Cony. H.R., supra note 21, art. 37.

26. R.I.C.J. (April 14, 1978) (visited May
cii .orlicjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetextlinlesofcourt.html>.

31,

1999)

<http://www.ici-
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Article 89 further states that:
1. If in the course of proceedings instituted by means of an
application, the applicant informs the Court in writing that it is
not going on with the proceedings, and if, at the date on which
this communication is received by the Registry, the respondent
has not yet taken any step in the proceedings, the Court shall
make an order officially recording the discontinuance of the
proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the list. A
copy of this order shall be sent by the Registrar to the respondent.
2. If, at the time when the notice of discontinuance is
received, the respondent has already taken some step in the
proceedings, the Court shall fix a time-limit within which the
respondent may state whether it opposes the discontinuance of the
proceedings. If no objection is made to the discontinuance before
the expiration of the time-limit, acquiescence will be presumed
and the Court shall make an order officially recording the
discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the removal of the
case from the list. If objection is made, the proceedings shall
continue.
3. If the Court is not sitting, its powers under this article may
be exercised by the President.'
It is appropriate to highlight that the Rules of the Inter-American
Court and those of the European Court of Human Rights do not make
reference to acceptance of a claim.
II.

A.

CONTENTIOUS JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

Discontinuance
Maqueda v. Argentina

The Maqueda Case was filed in the Inter-American Court by the InterAmerican Commission on May 25, 1994.30 The issue was whether there
had been a violation, by the Argentinean Government, of the American
27. Id. art. 88.
28. Id. art. 89.
29. Maqueda v. Argentina, Judgment of January 17, 1995, Inter-Am. CQ. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 18 (1995).
30. Id. para. 1.
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Convention by virtue of the sentencing of Guillermo Jos6 Maqueda, an
Argentine citizen, to ten years of imprisonment, in violation of the
Among the rights that the Commission alleged that
Convention. 3'
Argentina had violated in detriment of the alleged victim, were the right to
be heard by an impartial court; 32 the right to the presumption of
innocence; 33 and the right to appeal a decision before a judge or superior
The Commission also requested that the Court find that the
tribunal.'
Argentinean State ordered Guillermo Maqueda's immediate release by
means of pardon or commutation of the sentence, the payment of an
appropriate compensation, and of the costs of the proceedings. 35
According to the petition, Guillermo Maqueda was an active member
of Movimiento Todos por la Patria (All for the Fatherland Movement), a
political movement of a democratic nature that is legally recognized.3 6 Mr.
Maqueda attended a movement meeting held on January 22, 1989. 37 At the
meeting, motivated by the possibility of a military uprising in the La
Tablada Quarters, he decided to participate in a demonstration against the
uprising that was to take place the following day.38 Upon his arrival to the
vicinity of La Tablada Quarters, the group was faced with an armed
confrontation among a group of people that attempted to take over the base
and the military.39 These circumstances prevented the group from carrying
out the peaceful mobilization programmed and Maqueda left the place a
few hours later." Several members of the Movimiento Todos Por La
Patriaparticipated in the attack and were detained and condemned for the
commission of several offenses. 4 '
Several months later, on May 19, 1989, Mr. Maqueda was arrested. 42
On June 11, 1990, the San Martin Federal Chamber sentenced him to ten
years of prison as an accomplice in the crime of qualified unlawful
assembly, and an accessory in the offenses of rebellion, illegal seizure,
aggravated robbery, aggravated unlawful imprisonment, consummated and
attempted doubly aggravated homicides, and serious and minor damages.43
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. para. 2.
The Convention, supra note 7, art. 8.1.
Id. art. 8.2.
Id. art. 8.2.h.
Maqueda. (Ser. C) No.18, para. 2.
Id. para. 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. par. 4.
Maqueda, (Ser. C) No.18, pam. 4.
Id. para. 5.
Id. para. 6.
Id.
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His legal representatives lodged a special appeal that was rejected by the
San Martin Federal Chamber of Appeals on October 25, 1990." In view
of such denial, they lodged a complaint appeal for rejection of the special
appeal with the Supreme Court of the Nation which was also rejected on
March 17, 1992, thereby exhausting all existing procedural possibilities
provided for in the internal jurisdiction.4 5 According to the Commission,
Guillermo Maqueda did not have the possibility to lodge a remedy for
review of the judgment, since Law 23.077 does not provide for the
possibility of any appeal or broad remedy before any Court of Appeals
(only Appeal After Execution of the Judgment, an exceptional resource and
subject to restrictions), for which he also requested the Court that it
declared that Argentina should establish an ordinary mechanism that
guaranteed the double instance in the procedure established by the stated
Law 23.077.' The Argentinean Government was notified of the complaint
on June 24, 1994.' 7
On October 4, 1994, less than four months after filing the complaint,
the Commission notified the Court of its decision to discontinue the action
in the Maqueda Case because an agreement had been executed which
"welcomes the interests of the parties and . . . is in conformity with the
spirit and letter of the Convention."" In accordance with this agreement
signed on September 20, 1994, the Argentinean State committed to dictate
an ordinance of commutation of sentence which allowed Mr. Maqueda to
be paroled immediately.4 9 Subsequently, in December of 1994, Cejil and
Human Rights Watch/Americas in representation of Guillermo Maqueda's
parents informed the Court that they consented to the discontinuance
formulated by the Commission, and on December 12, 1994, the
Government expressed its favorable opinion concerning the request by the
Commission.' °
Consequently, taking into account the above mentioned and
considering that the principal matter of the case was the violation of Mr.
Maqueda's right to freedom, and that this right had been restored by the
agreement between the parties, the Court decided that the agreement did
not violate the letter and spirit of the American Convention. Although the
Commission submitted other rights protected under the Convention in its
complaint citing mechanisms and provisions of internal law, these rights
were pleaded in relation to the right to freedom. Notwithstanding such
conditions, the Court, mindful of its responsibility to protect human rights,
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Maqueda, (Ser. C) No.18, para. 6.
Id.
Id. para. 12.
Id. para. 16.
Id. para. 18.
Maqueda. (Ser. C) No.18, para. 21, 22.
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reserved the power to reopen and proceed with consideration of the case,
should at any future time a change occur in the circumstances that gave rise
to the agreement."
Therefore the Court, by means of its January 17, 1995 resolution,
admitted the discontinuance of the action presented by the Commission in
the Maqueda Case, and dismissed it.52 However, the Court reserved the
authority to reopen it and to continue the procedure of the case if there
would be in the future a change of circumstances that may give rise to the
agreement.5 3
B.

Acceptance of a Claim

Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname'
This case was filed in the Inter-American Court by the Inter-American
Commission on August 27, 1990. 5
The issue was whether the
Government of Suriname violated the American Convention to the
detriment of Daison Aloeboetoe, Dedemanu Aloeboetoe, Mikuwendje
Aloeboetoe, John Amoida, Richenel Voola, Martin Indisie Banai and Beri
Tiopo, all citizens of Surinam. Among the rights that the Commission
alleged were violated by Suriname were the right to life; the right to
humane treatment; the right to personal freedom; and the judicial
protection.-6 The Commission also requested that the relatives of the
victims be awarded a fair compensation."
In accordance with the guidelines of the Rules of the Court, the
Commission presented its memorandum of law on April 1, 1991, and the
Court received the memorandum in response from Suriname on June 28,
1991." The Government of Surinam presented preliminary exceptions
along with its memorandum.5 9 A public hearing was held on December 2,
1991, with the purpose of hearing the arguments of the parties regarding
preliminary exceptions.WO Although the hearing was scheduled to deal with

51. Id.para. 27.
52
Id.
53. Id.
54. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Judgment of December 4, 1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 11 (1994).
55. Id. para. 1.
56. Id. para. 2.
57. Id.
58. Id. para. 8.
59. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 8.
60. Id. para. 9.
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preliminary exceptions, at the meeting, the Government also recognized its
responsibility for the events giving rise to this case.61
According to the facts denounced before the Commission, the events
occurred on January 15, 1988, in Atjoni (landing stage of the village of
Pokigron, District of Sipaliwini) and in Tjongalangapassi, off kilometer 30
in the District of Brokopondo.' In the first of those places, Atjoni, more
than twenty unarmed, male maroons were beaten with rifle-butts by
soldiers who had detained them under the suspicion that they were
members of the Jungle Commando.' They were forced to lie facedown on
the ground while the soldiers stepped on their backs, tortured them, and
urinated on them.' The Captain of the village of Gujaba made a point of
telling Commander Leeflang of the Army that the persons in question were
civilians from several different villages.' Commander Leeflang ignored
this information.'
Following the Atjoni incident, the soldiers allowed some of the
However, the seven people previously
maroons to continue their trip.
mentioned were blindfolded and dragged into a milital, vehicle and driven
towards Paramaribo along the Tjongalangapassi road. Upon reaching the
kilometer 30, the vehicle stopped, and the victims were taken out and
ordered to dig.6 Richenel Voola tried to escape .70 They shot at him and
he fell to the ground, wounded, but they did not go after him.' Soon after,
shooting and screaming were heard.' The other six maroons were killed r3
On Monday, January 4, 1988, men from Gujaba and Grantatai arrived
at kilometer 30 at 7 p.m. 74 They found Aside, who was seriously wounded
and in critical condition, as well as the bodies of the other victims.75 Aside
indicated that he was the only survivor.76 The bodies of the other victims

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. para. 10.
Id. pam. 11.
Id.
Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No.
Id. para. 12.
Id.
Id. para. 13.
Id.
Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No.
Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No.
Id.
Id.

11, para. 11.

11, para. 14.

11, pam. 14.
11, para. 15.
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had been partially devoured by vultures.'
Aside was admitted in the
Academic Hospital of Paramaribo on January 6, 1988, but died soon
after.7" The accusation before the Inter-American Commission was signed
by Stanley Rensch who talked to Aside twice about what happened and
who corroborated the information stated by more than fifteen persons."
At the hearing, convened on December 2, 1991, for the purpose of
dealing with the preliminary objections, the Agent for Suriname declared
that "[t]he Republic of Suriname, having reference to the first case being
considered in the proceedings now before the Court, accepts responsibility
for the consequences of the Pokigron case, better known as Aloeboetoe et
al"' He later added: "I simply wish to reiterate [that Suriname] accepts its
responsibility in the instant case."'" Following a request for clarification by
the Commission's Delegate, Mr. Jackman, the Agent for Suriname
subsequently explained: "I believe my statement was clear: it accepts
responsibility. Consequently, the Court has the right to close the case, file
it, determine
the compensation payable or do whatever is appropriate under
82
the law."
Consequently, a judgment dated December 4, 1991, noted the
admission of responsibility made by the Republic of Suriname and decided
that the controversy had ceased regarding the facts that gave rise to this
case. 3 Later, by judgment dated September 10, 1993, the Court ordered
the pertinent actions on the reparation in this case."
El Amparo v. Venezuela'
The Inter-American Commission filed this case in the Court on
January 14, 1994. 6 The issue to be decided was whether the government
of Venezuela had violated the American Convention in detriment of Jos6 R.
Araujo, Luis A. Berrios, Mois6s A. Blanco, Julio P. Ceballos, Antonio
Eregua, Rafael M. Moreno, Jos6 Indalecio Guerrero, Arin 0. Maldonado,
Justo Mercado, Pedro Mosquera, Jos6 Puerta, Marino Torrealba, Josd

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Aloeboetoe, (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 16.
80. Id.
81. Id. para. 22.
82. Id.
83. Id. decision, para. 1.
84. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname (Reparations), Judgment of September 10, 1993, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15 (1994).
85. El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of January 18, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 19 (1995).
86. Id. para. 1.
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Torrealba and Marino Rivas, all Venezuelan citizens. 7 The Commission
alleged that Venezuela had violated the right to life; the right to humane
treatment; the judicial guarantees; the equality before the law; and the
judicial protection. 8
The Commission also requested that Venezuela
compensate and reimburse the direct relatives of the victims.8 9 Venezuela
answered the demand on August 1, 1994. 90
According to the petition, on October 29, 1988 in the "La Colorada"
canal, Distrito Piez, State of Apures, Venezuela, sixteen fishermen
residents of the town "El Amparo" were traveling in the direction of the
'La Colorada' Canal on the Arauca River to participate in a fishing trip, at
approximately 11:20 a.m. 9' When some fishermen were leaving the boat,
members of the military and the police of the "Comando Especifico" Jos6
Antonio Pfez" that were conducting a military operation denominated
"Anguila III," killed fourteen of the sixteen men.' Two of the fishermen,
Wollmer Gregorio Pinilla and Jos6 Augusto Arias, escaped by jumping into
the water and swimming across the "La Colorada" Canal. 93 The survivors
were protected by the Commander of the Police of El Amparo, Adfin de
Jesfis Tovar Araque, in spite of the fact that he was subjected to pressure
by police and military functionaries of San Crist6bal, State of Tfchira. 9
According to the petition, the Chief Inspector of the Intelligence and
Prevention Services Directorate, Celso Jos6 Rinc6n Fuentes, visited the
Chief of Police of El Amparo in the afternoon of October 29, 1988, and
said that they had killed fourteen guerrilla members and two had escaped. 95
By note of January 11, 1995, the government informed the President
that Venezuela "[d]oes not contest the facts referred to in the complaint and
accepts the international responsibility of the State,"' and requested the
Court to ask the Commission "[t]o come together to a non-litigious
procedure with the object of determining in friendly fashion, under
supervision by the Court, the reparations applicable, the preceding in
conformity with the provisions of articles 43 and 48 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court."' The Inter-American Commission was informed
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about this note by the Secretariat, and acknowledged receipt of the same on
January 13, 1995.9"
Consequently, by judgment dated January 18, 1995, the Court, took
note of the recognition of responsibility made by the Republic of
Venezuela." The Court decided that the controversy concerning the facts
that originated the case had ceased, and it decided that Venezuela was
liable for the payment of damages and to pay a fair indemnification to the
surviving victims and the next-of-kin of the deceased. "(o
Garrido and Baigorriav. Argentina"°"
This case was filed in the Court by the Inter-American Commission on
May 29, 1995. " The issue was whether the Government of Argentina
violated the American Convention in the disappearance of Ratil Baigorria
and Adolfo Garrido, Argentinean citizens."° The Commission alleged that
Argentina had violated the alleged victims' right to life; °4 the right to
humane treatment; 1 5 the judicial guarantees; °6 and the" judicial
protection.1 7
The Commission also requested that Argentina fully
indemnify the families of the victims for the grave material and moral
injury caused." °8
On September 11, 1995, Argentina answered the
petition. "
According to the demand, based upon the testimony of eyewitnesses,
on April 28, 1990, at approximately 4:00p.m., Adolfo Argentino GarridoCalder6n and Rafil Baigorria-Balmaceda were detained while driving
around." ° They were detained by uniformed personnel of the Police of
Mendoza in the General San Martin Park."' The vehicle in which the
detainees traveled was found by their relatives in the Fifth Police Station of
Mendoza.1 2 The Police stated that the vehicle had been found in the
98. Id.
99. Id. decision, para. 1.
100. Id. para. 1, 2.
101. Garrido v. Argentina, Judgment of February 2, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 26 (1996).
102. Id. para. 1.
103. Id. para. 2.
104. See The Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.
105. Id. art. 5.
106. Id. art. 8.1.
107. Id. art. 25.
108. Garrido,(Ser. C) No. 26, para. 2.
109. Id. para. 7.
110. Id. para.10.
111. Id.
112. Id. para.12.
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General San Martin Park as a result of an anonymous call claiming that
there was an abandoned car in that location."'
Mr. Garrido's relatives asked that Attorney Mabel Osorio find his
whereabouts since there was a judicial order for his detention.1 4 However,
Mr. Garrido was not detained at any police division. 1 On April 30, 1990,
a writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Mr. Garrido without any
results and the same thing happened to another habeas corpus filed on May
3, 1990, on behalf of Mr. Baigorria." 6 On September 19, 1991, a new
writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both missing persons, but it
was rejected. 1 17 The resolution was appealed before the Third Criminal
Chamber of Mendoza, which denied the appeal on November 25, 1991. "
On May 2, 1990, the Garrido family filed a formal complaint for the
disappearance of both men, which was processed in the Fourth Court of
Investigation of the First Judicial District. " Several years later the court
documents in this case were still in the initial stage of the proceedings.' 2
The family also denounced
2 the facts before the governmental authorities of
the County of Mendoza.' '
During the first five years following the disappearance of Mr. Garrido
and Mr. Baigorria, their relatives denounced the events at the local,
national, and international level." They made diverse claims before the
governmental authorities and they carried out an intense search in judicial,
police, and health facilities, all to no avail.'"
The Court considered it pertinent to transcribe the following two
paragraphs of Argentina's answer to the complaint:
The Government of Argentina accepts the facts set forth in Item II
of the application in relation to the situation of Mr. Rafi Baigorria
and Mr. Adolfo Garrido, facts which substantially coincide with
those raised in the presentation before the Illustrious InterAmerican Commission
on Human Rights that were not questioned
2
at that time.' 1
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The Government of the Republic of Argentina accepts the legal

consequences to the Government resulting from the facts referred
to in the previous paragraph in light of article 28(1) and (2) of the
American Convention on Human Rights inasmuch as the
competent court has not been able to identify the person or
persons criminally responsible for the crimes against Rafil
Baigorria and in that way clarify their whereabouts."
During the hearing held on February 1, 1996, the Alternate Agent
from Argentina, Ambassador Humberto Toledo expressed that his
government "Ilotally accept[ed] its international responsibility" and
reiterated "the acceptance of international responsibility of the Argentine
State in a case of this kind.""2
At the same hearing, the Commission expressed its agreement to the
terms of the acceptance of responsibility made by the Alternate Agent of
Argentina.'27
Consequently, by means of judgment entered on February 2, 1996,
not having outlined the discontinuance of the right, but instead of the
action, it took note of the acceptance made by Argentina of the acts stated
in the application and the acceptance of international responsibility for
those acts. 128 Additionally, it granted the parties a period of six months to
reach an agreement on reparations and compensation.' 29 Failure to reach
an agreement would allow the Court to continue the proceedings regarding
reparations and compensations.

30

III. CONCLUSION
The following conclusions may be reached from the analysis of the use of
the procedural forms of discontinuance and acceptance of a claim in the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court:
1. The discontinuance is a procedural form of extreme
importance because it is a medium to which the Commission can
appeal, after it has presented a case to the Court and arrived to an
agreement with the demanded State to terminate the process. It
reflects a serious and responsible attitude by the parties in a case,
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to utilize the principle of procedural economy and thus, avoid
unnecessary expenses to the Inter-American System.
2. The acceptance of a claim also has an enormous importance
because it represents a serious and responsible attitude by the
States demanded before the Court, since they opt to assume its
responsibilities rather than contend the facts of the demand and
they do not subject the Court and the system to a long and
difficult process.
3. The procedural form of acceptance of a claim is properly
regulated in the Rules of the Court.
4. In the case of the acceptance of a claim, this procedural form
is not in the Rules of the Court therefore, given its importance, it
would be convenient to regulate it as well as its procedural
effects. Mainly, the Court should expressly point out the rights
that the demanded States would be responsible of violating as a
consequence of the acceptance of a claim.
5. The precedents invoked in this comment can end up being
relevant in the measure in which in the future, other States decide
to follow them thereby strengthening the Inter-American system
for the protection of human rights.

